Abstract. Cauchy's contribution to the foundations of analysis is often viewed through the lens of developments that occurred some decades later, namely the formalisation of analysis on the basis of the epsilon-delta doctrine in the context of an Archimedean continuum. What does one see if one refrains from viewing Cauchy as if he had read Weierstrass already? One sees, with Felix Klein, a parallel thread for the development of analysis, in the context of an infinitesimal-enriched continuum. One sees, with Emile Borel, the seeds of the theory of rates of growth of functions as developed by Paul du Bois-Reymond. One sees, with E. G. Björling, an infinitesimal definition of the criterion of uniform convergence. Cauchy's foundational stance is hereby reconsidered.
, he momentarily entertained a faint glimmer of hope. The book draws its title from an older essay, entitled Who Gave You the Epsilon? Cauchy and the origins of rigorous calculus [61] . The faint hope was that the book would approach the thesis implied by the title of the older essay, in a critical spirit, namely, as an ahistorical 1 tale in need of re-examination. Anderson et al not having undertaken the latter task, such an attempt is made here.
Cauchy based his definitions of both limits and infinitesimals on the concept of a variable quantity. 2 The variable quantities used in his Cours d'Analyse in 1821 are generally understood by scholars as being (discrete) sequences of values. Cauchy wrote that a variable quantity tending to zero becomes infinitely small. How do his null sequences become infinitesimals? In 1829, Cauchy developed a detailed theory of infinitesimals of arbitrary order (not necessarily integer), based on rates of growth of functions. How does his theory connect with the work 1 See Grattan-Guinness's comment on ahistory in the main text around footnote 65. C. Gilain's claims to the effect that "Cauchy définissait le concept d'infiniment petità l'aide du concept de limite, qui avait le premier rôle" [54, footnote 67] are both in error; see Subsection 3.1 below. Already in 1973, Hourya Benis Sinaceur wrote: "on dit trop rapidement que c'est Cauchy qui a introduit la 'méthode des limites' entendant par là, plus ou moins vaguement, l'emploi systématique de l'épsilonisation" [123, p. 108] , and pointed out that Cauchy's definition of limit resembles, not that of Weierstrass, but rather that of Lacroix dating from 1810 [123, p. 109] .
of later authors? In 1902, E. Borel elaborated on du Bois-Reymond's theory of rates of growth, and outlined a general "theory of increase" of functions, as a way of implementing an infinitesimal-enriched continuum. Borel traced the lineage of such ideas to Cauchy's text. We examine several views of Cauchy's foundational contribution in analysis.
Cauchy's foundational stance has been the subject of an ongoing controversy. The continuing relevance of Cauchy's foundational stance stems from the fact that Cauchy developed some surprisingly modern mathematics using infinitesimals. The following four items deserve to be mentioned:
(1) Cauchy's proof of the binomial formula (series) for arbitrary exponents. The proof exploits infinitesimals. D. Laugwitz [90, p. 266] argues that this is the first correct proof of the formula.
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(2) Cauchy's use of the Dirac delta function. Over a century before Dirac, Cauchy exploited "delta functions" to solve problems in Fourier analysis and in the evaluation of singular integrals. Such functions were defined in terms of an infinitesimal parameter, see Freudenthal [51] , Laugwitz [91, p. 219] , [92] .
(3) Cauchy's definition of continuity. Cauchy defined continuity of a function y = f (x) as follows: an infinitesimal change α of the independent variable x always produces an infinitesimal change f (x + α) − f (x) of the dependent variable y [24, p. 34] . Nearly half a century later, Weierstrass reconstructed Cauchy's infinitesimal definition in the following terms: for every ǫ > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that for every real α, if |α| < δ then |f (x + α) − f (x)| < ǫ. Many historians have sought to interpret Cauchy's definition as a proto-Weierstrassian definition of continuity in terms of limits. 4 (4) Cauchy's "sum theorem". This result asserts the convergence to a continuous function, of a series of continuous functions under a suitable condition of convergence. The sum theorem has been the subject of a historical controversy, ever since A. Robinson [112, p. 271-273] proposed a novel reading of the sum theorem that would make it correct.
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The controversy hinges on the question whether the convergence condition was meant by Cauchy to hold at the points of an Archimedean continuum, or at the points of a Bernoullian continuum, namely, an infinitesimal-enriched continuum (see Subsection 2.4). Lakatos presented a paper 5 in 1966 where he argues that the 1821 result is correct as stated. 6 Laugwitz concurs, see e.g. his 1989 text [91] . PostWeierstrassian historians tend both (a) to reject Cauchy's infinitesimals, claiming they are merely shorthand for limits, and (b) to claim that his 1821 sum theorem was false. The 1821 formulation of the sum theorem may in the end be too ambiguous to know what Cauchy's intention was at the time, if Cauchy himself knew.
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The four examples given above hopefully illustrate the interest in understanding the nature of Cauchy's foundational contribution.
In Section 2, we provide a re-appraisal of Cauchy's foundational stance, including Cauchy's theory of orders of infinitesimals based on orders of growth of functions (Subsection 2.1); how Cauchy null sequences become infinitesimals (Subsection 2.2); a detailed textual study of the related portions of the Cours d'Analyse (Subsection 2.3); an analysis of Cauchy's key term toujours, strengthening the hypothesis of his sum theorem (Subsection 2.4); an examination of some common misconceptions in the Cauchy literature (Subsection 2.5).
In Section 3, we analyze the views of some modern authors. In Section 4, we provide a timeline of the development of theories of infinitesimals based on orders of growth of functions, from Cauchy through Paul du Bois-Reymond to modern times. Some conclusions and outlook for the future may be found in Section 5. Appendix A outlines the relevant mathematical material on the rival continua, Archimedean and Bernoullian.
2.
A reappraisal of Cauchy's foundational stance 2.1. Cauchy's theory of orders of infinitesimals. Cauchy's 1821 Cours d'Analyse [24] presented only a theory of infinitesimals of polynomial rate of growth as compared to a given "base" infinitesimal α.
The shortcoming of such a theory is its limited flexibility. Since Cauchy only considers infinitesimals behaving as polynomials of a fixed infinitesimal, called the "base" infinitesimal in 1823 [25] , his framework 5 The paper was published posthumously in 1978 and edited by J. Cleave [89] . 6 Lakatos thereby reversed his position as presented in his Proofs and Refutations [88] . 7 See more details in Subsection 2.4.
imposes obvious limitations on what can be done with such infinitesimals. Thus, one typically can't extract the square root of such a "polynomial" infinitesimal. What is remarkable is that Cauchy did develop a theory to overcome this shortcoming. Cauchy's theory of infinitesimals of arbitrary order (not necessarily integer) is noted by A. Borel [16, p. 35-36] (see below) .
In 1823, and in more detail in 1829, Cauchy develops a more flexible theory, where an infinitesimal is represented by an arbitrary function (rather than merely a polynomial) of a base infinitesimal, denoted "i", see Chapter 6 in [27] . The title of the chapter is significant. Indeed, the title refers to functions as representing the infinitesimals; more precisely, "fonctions qui représentent des quantités infiniment petites". Here is what Cauchy has to say in 1829:
Designons par a un nombre constant, rationnel ou irrationnel; par i une quantité infiniment petite, et par r un nombre variable. Dans le systeme de quantités infiniment petites dont i sera la base, une fonction de i representée par f (i) sera un infiniment petit de l'ordre a, si la limite du rapport f (i)/i r est nulle pour toutes les valeurs de r plus petites que a, et infinie pour toutes les valeurs de r plus grandes que a [27, p. 281]. Laugwitz [90, p. 271 ] explains this to mean that the order a of the infinitesimal f (i) is the uniquely determined real number (possibly +∞, as with the function e −1/t 2 ) such that f (i)/i r is infinitesimal for r < a and infinitely large for r > a.
Laugwitz [90, p. 272] notes that Cauchy provides an example of functions defined on positive reals that represent infinitesimals of orders ∞ and 0, namely e −1/i and 1 log i (see Cauchy [27, p. 326-327] ).
The development of non-Archimedean systems based on orders of growth was pursued in earnest at the end of the 19th century by such authors as Stolz, du Bois-Reymond, Levi-Civita, and Borel. Similarly, the notion of Cauchy as a pre-Weierstrassian who allegedly "tried to dislodge infinitesimals from analysis" is just as dubious. Taken to its logical conclusion, the dogma of Cauchy as a pre-Weierstrassian can assume comical proportions. Thus, the fashionable Stephen Hawking comments that Cauchy was particularly concerned to banish infinitesimals [68, p. 639 ], yet on the very same page 639, Hawking quotes Cauchy's infinitesimal definition of continuity in the following terms: the function f (x) remains continuous with respect to x between the given bounds, if, between these bounds, an infinitely small increment in the variable always produces an infinitely small increment in the function itself [68, p. 639 ]. Did Cauchy "banish" infinitesimals? Using infinitely small increments is an odd way of doing so. Similarly, historian J. Gray lists continuity among concepts Cauchy allegedly defined 9 The reference is to Skolem's 1934 work [124] . The evolution of modern infinitesimals is traced further in the main text in Section 4 following footnote 71.
10 More specifically, Cauchy was not in the possession of the mathematical tools required to either formulate or justify the ultrapower construction, requiring as it does a set-theoretic framework (dating from the end of the 19th century) together with the existence of ultrafilters (not proved until 1930 by Tarski [131] Our author interprets A. Cauchy's approach as a formation of the idea of an infinitely small -a variant of the approach which was developed in the XXth century in the framework of the nonstandard analysis (a hyperreal version of E. Hewitt, J. Los, A. Robinson). The referee's summary is an inaccurate description of the text refereed. Cauchy's approach is not a variant of Robinson's, and was never claimed to be in this text. Based on such a strawman version of the article's conception, the referee came to the following conclusion:
From my point of view the author's arguments to support this conception are quite unconvincing. Indeed, we find such such a strawman conception unconvincing, but the conception was the referee's, not the authors'. The referee concluded as follows:
The fact that the actual infinitesimals lived somewhere in the consciousness of A. Cauchy (as in many another mathematicians of XIXth -XXth centuries as, for example, N.N. Luzin) does not abolish his (and theirs) constant aspiration to dislodge them in the subconsciousness and to found the calculus on the theory of limit.
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Did Cauchy have a "constant aspiration to dislodge infinitesimals in the subconsciousness and to found the calculus on the theory of limit"? Certainly not. Felix Klein knew better: fifty years before Robinson, Klein clearly realized the potential of the infinitesimal approach to the foundations. Having outlined the developments in real analysis associated with Weierstrass and his followers, Klein pointed out that 11 See [77, 75] for further discussion of the post-Weierstrassian bias in Cauchy scholarship. 12 The pdf of the version submitted to Blay, as well as the two referee reports, may be found at http://u.cs.biu.ac.il/∼katzmik/straw.html 13 Opposing infinitesimals and limits is in itself a conceptual error; see footnote 33. Cauchy did not aspire to dislodge infinitesimals from analysis; on the contrary, he used them with increasing frequency in his work, including his 1853 article [28] where he relied on infinitesimals to express the property of uniform convergence, as we analyze in Subsection 2.4.
How does a null sequence become a Cauchy infinitesimal?
The nature of Cauchy's infinitesimals has been the subject of an ongoing debate for a number of decades. Post-Weierstrassian historians tend to dismiss Cauchy's infiniment petits as merely a linguistic device masking Cauchy's use of the limit concept. From this perspective, Cauchy's infinitesimals are alleged to represent an early anticipation of the more rigorous methods developed in the second half of the 19th century, namely epsilontic analysis. Hourya Benis Sinaceur [123] presented a critical analysis of the proto-Weierstrassian approach to Cauchy in 1973, pointing out in particular that Cauchy's notion of limit is for the most part a kinetic one rather than an epsilontic one. 15 Other historians have taken Cauchy's infinitesimals at face value, see e.g., Lakatos [89] , Laugwitz [91] . The studies in the past decade include Sad, Teixeira, and Baldino [116] , Bråting [22] , and Katz & Katz [75] . 14 Klein also formulated a criterion of what it would take for a theory of infinitesimals to be successful. Namely, one must be able to prove a mean value theorem for arbitrary intervals, including infinitesimal ones. In 1928, A. Fraenkel [49, pp. 116-117] formulated a similar requirement in terms of the mean value theorem. Such a Klein-Fraenkel criterion is satisfied by the Hewitt-Loś-Robinson theory by the transfer principle, see Appendix A. 15 Pourciau [109] argues that Newton possessed a clear kinetic conception of limit similar to Cauchy's, and cites Newton's lucid statement to the effect that "Those ultimate ratios . . . are not actually ratios of ultimate quantities, but limits . . . which they can approach so closely that their difference is less than any given quantity. . . " See Newton [106, p. 39] and [107, p. 442] . The same point, and the same passage from Newton, appeared a century earlier in Russell [114, item 316, p. 338-339] . See also footnote 33. To what extent did Cauchy intend the process that he described as a null sequence "becoming" an infinitesimal, to involve some kind of a collapsing?
Cauchy did not have access to the modern set theoretic mentality (currently dominant in the area of mathematics), where equivalence relation and quotient space constructions are taken for granted. One can still ponder the following question: to what extent may Cauchy have anticipated such collapsing phenomena?
Part of the difficulty in answering such a question is Cauchy's handson approach to foundations. Cauchy was less interested in foundational issues than, say, Bolzano.
16 To Cauchy, getting your sedan out of the garage was the only justification for shoveling away the snow that blocks the garage door. Once the door open, Cauchy is in top gear within seconds, solving problems and producing results. To him, infinitesimals were the asphalt under the snow, not the snow itself. Bolzano wanted to shovel away all the snow from the road. Half a century later, the triumvirate 17 shovel ripped out the asphalt together with the snow, intent on consigning the infinitesimal to the dustbin of history.
For these reasons, it is not easy to gauge Cauchy's foundational stance precisely. For instance, is there evidence that he felt that two null sequences that coincide except for a finite number of terms, would "generate" the same infinitesimal?
18 Support for this idea comes from several sources, including a very unlikely one, namely Felscher's essay [46] in The American Mathematical Monthly from 2000, where he attacks both Laugwitz's interpretation and the idea that infinitesimals play a foundational role in Cauchy.
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In his zeal to do away with Cauchy's infinitesimals, Felscher seeks to describe them in terms of the modern terminology of germs. Here two sequences are in the same germ if they agree at infinity, i.e., for all sufficiently large values of the index n of the sequence u n : n ∈ N , 16 18 Note that the term "generate" was used by K. Bråting [22] to describe the passage from sequence to infinitesimal in Cauchy. 19 Felscher's text is examined in more detail in Subsection 3.2.
0 that is, are equal almost everywhere. 20 Felscher's maneuver successfully eliminates the term "infinitesimal" from the picture, but has the effect of undermining Felscher's own thesis, by lending support to the presence of such "collapsing" in Cauchy.
Indeed, the idea of reading germs of sequences into Cauchy is precisely Laugwitz's thesis in [90, p. 272] . Germs of sequences are also the basis of Laugwitz's Ω-calculus [117] , a ring constructed using a Fréchet filter.
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In an editorial footnote to Lakatos's essay, J. Cleave outlines a nonArchimedean system developed by Chwistek [29] , involving a quotient by a Fréchet filter (similarly to the Schmieden-Laugwitz construction). Cleave then concludes that the relation of such infinitesimals to Cauchy's is "obvious". 22 To us it appears that the said relation requires additional argument.
Cauchy's published work contains evidence that he intuitively sensed a "collapsing" involved in the passage from a null sequence to an infinitesimal. Thus, the second chapter of the Cours d'Analyse [24] of 1821 contains a series of theorems (eight of them) whose main purpose appears to be to emphasize the importance of the asymptotic behavior of the sequence (i.e., as the index tends to infinity). This thread is pursued in more detail in Subsection 2.3. Furthermore, he refers to his infinitesimals as "quantities", a term he uses in the context of an ordered number system, as opposed to the complex numbers which are always "expressions" but never "quantities". In fact, the recent English translation [21] of the Cours d'Analyse erroneously translates one 20 Equality "almost everywhere" is a 20th century concept; Felscher seems to suggest that Cauchy thought of the relation between his variable quantities and his infinitesimals in a way that would be later described as equality almost everywhere. 21 In the Schmieden-Laugwitz construction, a Fréchet filter is used where an ultrafilter would be used in a hyperreal construction; see Appendix A. 22 Cleave writes in his footnote 32*: "A construction of non-standard analysis is given in Chwistek [29] (1948) which is derived from a paper published in 1926. It is basically the reduced power R N /F where F is the Fréchet filter on the natural numbers (the collection of cofinite sets of natural numbers) (see Frayne, Morel, and Scott [50] ) [. . . ] This particular construction is not an elementary extension of R but there are sufficiently powerful transfer properties to enable some nonstandard analysis to be performed. It may be observed that the elements of R N /F are equivalence classes of sequences of reals, two sequences s 1 , s 2 . . . and t 1 , t 2 , . . . being counted equal if for some n, s m = t m for all m ≥ n. The relation of these classes to Cauchy's variables is obvious" [89, p. 160] . of Cauchy's complex "expressions" as a "quantity", and the reviewer for Zentralblatt dutifully notes this error.
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A second aspect of collapsing is the mental transformation of the process of "tending to zero" into a concept/noun (as a null sequence is transformed into an infinitesimal), thought of as a reification, or encapsulation, of a highly compressed process. 24 In the successive theorems in his Chapter 2, Cauchy seeks to collapse the initial articulation of his infinitesimal α as a temporally-deployed process, by deliberately leaving out the implied index (i.e. label of the terms of the sequence), and by explicitly specifying and emphasizing a rival index: the exponent in a power α n of the infinitesimal, thought of as an infinitesimal of a higher and higher order.
We will examine Cauchy's approach further in Section 2.3 by means of a detailed analysis of his text.
An analysis of Cours d'Analyse and its infinitesimals.
We will refer to the pages in the Cours d'Analyse [24] itself, rather than the collected works.
Cauchy's Chapter 2, section 1 starts on page 26. Here Cauchy writes that a variable quantity becomes infinitely small if, etc. Here "infinitely small" is an adjective, and is not used as a noun-adjective pair.
On page 27, Cauchy employs the noun-adjective combination, by referring to "infinitely small quantities" (quantités infiniment petites, still in the feminine). He denotes such a quantity α. Note that the index in the implied sequence is suppressed (namely, α appears without a lower index).
25
On page 28, he introduces a competing numerical index, namely the exponent, by forming the infinitesimals
By the time we reach the bottom of the page (fourth line from the bottom), he is already employing "infinitely small" as a noun in its own right: infiniment petits (in the masculine plural). On page 29, Theorem 1 asserts that a highest-order infinitesimal will be smaller than all the others (infinitesimals are consistently referred 23 The reviewer, Reinhard Siegmund-Schultze, was far more sensitive to Cauchy's infinitesimals on this occasion than in an earlier instance, occasioned by a review of Felscher's text; see footnote 56. 24 In the education literature, such a compressing phenomenon is studied under the name of procept (process+concept) [65] , encapsulation [38] , and reification [120] . 25 Note that Cauchy uses lower indices to indicate terms in a sequence in his proof of the intermediate value theorem [24 to in the masculine). The theorem has not yet chosen a letter label for the competing index (i.e. order of infinitesimal). Still on page 29, Theorem 2 for the first time introduces a label for the order of the infinitesimal, namely the letter n, as in
On page 30, Theorem 3 introduces several different letter indices:
for the orders of his infinitesimals. The theorem concerns the order of the sum, again compelling the student to focus on the competing orders (at the expense of the suppressed index of the "variable quantity" itself). Still on page 30, Theorem 4 introduces the terminology of polynomials in α, and describes their orders n, n ′ , n ′′ . . . for the first time as a "sequence". We now have two "sequences": (the variable quantity) α itself, whose index is implicit (was never labeled), and the sequence of orders, which are both emphasized and elaborately labeled using "primes" ′ and double primes ′′ . In all these theorems, it is the asymptotic behavior of null sequences that is constantly emphasized, which suggests that Cauchy might have found it perfectly natural to identify/collapse sequences that agree almost everywhere. Terminology finit parêtre, finit par devenir (suggestive of such collapse) is employed repeatedly.
On pages 31 and 32, three additional theorems and one corollary are stated, for a total of eight results on the asymptotic behavior of such null sequences.
By the time Cauchy reaches Section 2 of Chapter 2 on page 34 (concerning continuity of functions), he has already encapsulated the process implied in the notion of "variable quantity", into the concept/masculine noun infiniment petit. When he evokes an infinitely small x-increment α, only a stubborn Weierstrassian will refuse to interpret his α as a concept/noun. The second definition (out of the three definitions of continuity given here) is the one Cauchy italicizes, implying it is the main one. Here both the x-increment and the y-increment are described as infinitely small increments (see Table 1 ).
In this context, the verb "become" is being used in two different senses:
(a) the terms in the sequence become smaller than any number; (b) the encapsulating sense of a process being compressed into (and thus becoming) a concept/noun, as analyzed by Sad, Teixeira, and Baldino [116] , who employed the terminology of a transformation of essence. It is interesting to note that Bolzano fought against the sense (a), by suppressing the parametrisation altogether, and viewing the null sequence as a set (perhaps he was influenced by Zeno paradoxes), but not against the sense (b). Note Cauchy's emphasis on the noun aspect of his infinitesimals: Lorsque les valeurs numériques 26 successives d'une même variable décroissent indéfiniment, de manièreà s'abaisser au-dessous de tout nombre donné, cette variable devient ce qu'on nomme un infiniment petit ou une quantité infiniment petite. Une variable de cette espèce a zéro pour limite [24, p. 4] . The use of the noun, un infiniment petit, makes it difficult to interpret the "becoming" in the sense (a) above; rather, the definition requires sense (b) to be grammatically coherent. Here the variable [quantity] becomes a masculine noun: un infiniment petit. Cauchy is very precise here: it is the limit of the variable that's zero. The variable itself becomes an infiniment petit. Cauchy wrote neither that a variable is an infinitesimal, nor that the limit of the infinitesimal is zero, but rather that the limit of the variable is zero, cf. [116, p. 301-302] .
Once the use of infiniment petit as a noun is established, Cauchy freely uses the term interchangeably as a noun or as an adjective.
Cauchy's Cours d'Analyse presented only a theory of infinitesimals of polynomial rate of growth as compared to a given α. His theory of infinitesimals of more general order, and its influence on later authors 0 such as E. Borel, was already discussed in Section 1; 27 see Section 4 for a broader historical perspective. In Subsection 2.4, we will discuss a specific application Cauchy makes of his infinitesimals, in the context of the sum theorem.
2.4. Microcontinuity and Cauchy's sum theorem. How is Cauchy able to define concepts such as uniform continuity and uniform convergence in terms of a single variable, unlike standard definitions thereof which call for a pair of variables?
Let x be in the domain of a function f , and consider the following condition, which we will call microcontinuity at x:
Then ordinary continuity of f is equivalent to f being microcontinuous on the Archimedean continuum (A-continuum for short), i.e., at every point x of its domain in the A-continuum. Meanwhile, uniform continuity of f is equivalent to f being microcontinuous on the Bernoulian continuum (B-continuum for short), i.e., at every point x of its domain in the B-continuum (the relation of the two continua is discussed in more detail in Appendix A). Consider, for example, the function sin(1/x) defined for positive x. The function fails to be uniformly continuous because microcontinuity fails at a positive infinitesimal x (due to ever more rapid oscillation). The function x 2 fails to be uniformly continuous because of the failure of microcontinuity at an infinite member of the B-continuum.
A similar distinction exists between pointwise convergence and uniform convergence. 28 Which condition did Cauchy have in mind in 1821? Abel interpreted it as convergence on the A-continuum, and presented "exceptions" (what we would call today counterexamples) in 1826. Additional such exceptions were published by Seidel and Stokes in the 1840s.
Cauchy's contemporary E. G. Björling anticipated the B-continuum definition in a remarkable passage dating from 1852:
when one comes to show that in a series, of which the terms are functions of a quantity x, converges [. . . ] for each given value of x up to a certain limit X, it is not necessary to believe that the series continues necessarily to converge [. . . ] for values of x indefinitely close to that limit (Björling [12, p. 455] , as cited by Grattan-Guinness [63, p. 232]). Here the "limit" X is clearly a member of the usual Archimedean continuum; but what is the nature of the x mentioned at the end of Björling's phrase? Bjorling's reference to convergence at x implies that x is understood to be an individual/atomic element of the domain; yet speaking of x as being "indefinitely close" to X is meaningless in the context of an A-continuum. One faces a stark choice of either toeing the triumvirate line on the "true" continuum and therefore finding Björling's arguments "absurd", as Pringsheim did [110, p. 345]; 29 or, removing the blinders so as to envision a mid-19th century anticipation of an infinitesimal-enriched continuum.
Cauchy clarified/modified his position on the sum theorem in 1853.
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In his text [28] , he specified a stronger condition of convergence on the B-continuum, including at x = 1 n (explicitly mentioned by Cauchy). The stronger condition bars Abel's counterexample.
To give a more detailed explanation of Cauchy's 1853 text, note that Cauchy's approach is based on two assumptions which can be stated in modern terminology as follows:
(1) when you have a closed expression for a function, then its values at "variable quantities" (such as x = 1 n ) are calculated by using the same closed expression as at real values; (2) to evaluate a function at a variable quantity generated by a sequence, one evaluates term-by-term. Now in 1853 Cauchy analyzed Abel's counterexample (without mentioning Abel's name) by first writing down the closed form of the sum of the remainder of the series. This is given by a certain integral. He proceeded to evaluate it at an infinitesimal x = 1 n using assumption (1) . Concretely, he substituted the values 1 n into the closed expression (integral) using assumption (2) . The sequence he got was not a null sequence. He concluded that the remainder term at this particular infinitesimal is not an infinitesimal. Hence, he concluded, the "always" part of his hypothesis is not satisfied by Abel's example.
Thus, Cauchy's clarification/modification from 1853 amounts to requiring convergence on an incipient form of a B-continuum. Some historians acknowledge his clarification/modification, and interpret it as the addition of the condition of uniform convergence, while adhering to an A-continuum framework. The recent text [75] argued that such an 0 interpretation is problematic. Namely, Cauchy states the condition in terms of a single variable, whereas the traditional definition of uniform continuity or convergence in the context of an A-continuum necessarily requires a pair of variables. Cauchy specifically evokes x = 1 n where Abel's "exception/counterexample" fails to converge. The matter is discussed in detail by K. Bråting [22] .
2.5. Five common misconceptions in the Cauchy literature. Both Laugwitz and Hourya Benis Sinaceur [123] have exposed a number of misconceptions in the literature concerning Cauchy's foundational work. Five of the most common ones are reproduced below in italics.
Bolzano, Cauchy, and Weierstrass were all gardeners who contributed to the ripening of the fruit of the notion of limit.
Here the implicit assumption is that the Weierstrassian epsilontic notion of "limit" in the context of an Archimedean continuum is the centerpiece of any possible edifice of analysis. Such an assumption is questionable on two counts. First, as Felix Klein pointed out in 1908, there are two parallel threads in the development of analysis, one based on an Archimedean continuum, and the other exploiting an infinitesimal-enriched continuum. 31 One risks pre-judging the outcome of any analysis of Cauchy by postulating that he is working in the Archimedean thread. The second implicit assumption is that the Weierstrassian notion of limit is central in Cauchy. Thus, Boyer [19, p. 277] postulates that Cauchy is working with a notion of limit similar to the Weierstrassian one. This requires further argument, and at least at first glance is incorrect: Cauchy emphasizes infinitesimals as a foundational notion, but he never emphasizes limits as a foundational notion. Thus, in Cauchy's definition of continuity the word "limit" does occur, but only in the sense of the "endpoint" of the interval of definition of the function, rather than the behavior of its values. During the period 1814-1820, Cauchy appears to have been ambivalent about infinitesimals. Starting in about 1821, he uses them with increasing frequency both in his textbooks and his research publications, and insists on the centrality of infinitesimals as a foundational notion; see Section 4 for a related chronology.
Cauchy was forced to teach infinitesimals at the Ecole.
The intended implication appears to be that Cauchy only used infinitesimals because of the pressure from the Ecole administration. During the period 1814-1820 there were some tensions with the administration over the delayed appearance of infinitesimals in the syllabus, see [54] . At any rate, Cauchy continued using infinitesimals thoughout his career and long after completing his teaching stint at the Ecole in 1830. Thus he reproduces his 1821 definition of continuity (in terms of infinitesimals) as late as 1853, in his text on the sum theorem [28] , see Subsection 2.4.
Cauchy based his infinitesimals on the notion of limit.
This is an ambiguous claim, and essentially a play on words on the term "limit". The modern audience understands "limit" as a Weierstrassian epsilontic notion. If this is what is claimed, then the claim is false. As far as the kinetic notion of limit that Cauchy does mention in discussing a variable quantity approaching a limit, it is conspicuously absent in Cauchy's discussion of infinitesimals. Thus, rather than infinitesimals being based on the notion of limit, it is the notion of a variable quantity that's primitive, and both infinitesimals and limits are defined in terms of it (see Subsection 3.1 for a more detailed discussion). Note again that the term "limit" does appear in Cauchy's definition of continuity, but in an entirely different sense, namely endpoint of the interval where the function is defined. 33 
Cauchy introduced rigor into calculus that anticipates the rigor of Weierstrass.
While Cauchy certainly emphasizes rigor, postulating a continuity between Cauchy's rigor and Weierstrassian rigor is a methodological 33 To elaborate, we will note that the purported opposition between infinitesimals and limits (a frequently found claim in the literature) is a conceptual error in its own right. The opposition is not between limits and infinitesimals. Limits are present in both approaches. In the infinitesimal approach, limits can be defined in terms of the standard part function, and the latter in terms of limits. The true opposition is between infinitesimals, on the one hand, and epsilon-delta with its quantifier complications, on the other. The preoccupation with the word "limit" can be exposed as a purely linguistic one by the following thought experiment, based on Pourciau's lucid analysis, see footnote 15. Imagine that Newton had developed an "ult" notation for his ultimate ratios, e.g., ult h→0 34 To Cauchy, rigor meant abandoning the principle of the "generality of algebra" as practiced by Euler, Lagrange, and others, and its replacement by geometry-and by infinitesimals.
Comments by modern authors
In this section, we analyze some comments by modern authors related to Cauchy's foundational contribution. See Klein's comments discussed in the main text around footnote 14, concerning the two parallel strands for the development of analysis.
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"We know that Cauchy defined the concept of infinitely small by means of the concept of limit, which played the primary role." Thus, Cauchy defined both infinitesimals and limits in terms of variable quantities. Neither is the limit concept primary, nor are infinitesimals defined in terms of limits, contrary to Gilain's claims. 
39 To be sure, it is both legitimate and necessary to examine Cauchy's predecessors, including d'Alembert, if one wishes to understand Cauchy himself. Indeed, a debate of long standing (over a century long, in fact) had opposed two rival methodologies in the study of the foundations of the new science of Newton and Leibniz:
(A) a methodology eschewing infinitesimals; and (B) a methodology favoring them.
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It is legitimate to ask which of the two methodologies is the one that underpins Cauchy's oeuvre. However, Felscher's conceptual framework is flawed in a fundamental way. The outcome of his investigation is predetermined from the outset by the following two factors:
(1) Felscher's exclusive focus on d'Alembert, 41 one of the radical adherents of the A-methodology, and (2) Felscher's postulating a methodological continuity between the work of d'Alembert and Cauchy (see also Subsection 3.3). Displaying a masterly command of scholarly Latin, Felscher offers the reader a glimpse of the bestiarium infinitesimale in section 6 of his essay, starting on page 856. The punchline comes in the middle of page 857, where Felscher points out that Cauchy refers specifically to numerical values of his variables, the latter being described by Cauchy as becoming infinitesimals.
The adjective numerical is linked etymologically to the noun number . Cauchy's numbers (unlike his quantities) are certainly appreciable (i.e., neither infinitesimal nor infinite, nor even negative), as can be seen by reading the first page Préliminaires of his 1821 Cours D'Analyse. 38 For a similar misconception in Smithies, see footnote 4. 42 Felscher's etymological insight offers a refutation of the Luzin hypothesis, 43 to the effect that Cauchy variables may pass through nonArchimedean values on their way to zero. Has Felscher shown that Cauchy's bestiarium infinitesimale is in fact uninhabited?
Hardly so. While chasing out the infinitesimal mouse of Luzin's hypothesis 44 for the Cauchy variable, Felscher missed the elephant of the possibility of the variable becoming an infinitesimal through a process of reification (see Subsection 2.2).
On page 846, Felscher quotes an agitated passage from d'Alembert's 1754 article. D'Alembert attacks the obscurity, and even the falsehood of a definition of infinitesimals attributed to unnamed geometers, and sums up his thesis by accusing such geometers of charlatanerie, a term ably translated as quackery by Felscher, who sums up as follows:
Reading these words today we may get the impression that they were written at the time of Weierstrass or Cantor, 45 or even by a contemporary mathematician. 43 Luzin himself, in fact, similarly rejected non-Archimedean time, as discussed by Medvedev [102] . 44 Luzin was probably not the first and surely not the last to formulate a hypothesis to the effect that Cauchy's variable quantities pass through infinitesimal values on their way to zero. Lakatos [89, p. 153 [104, p. 505] . This was perhaps the most vitriolic opposition to the B-continuum (see Appendix A) prior to Errett Bishop's debasement of meaning, a term he applied to classical mathematics in general in 1973 [11] , and to infinitesimal calculusà la Robinson in particular, in 1975 [10] , see [77] and [76] for details. 46 It is worth pondering which contemporary mathematician (known for antiinfinitesimal vitriol) Felscher may have had in mind here, given his interest in intuitionistic logics [44, 45] , see also [76] .
It is sobering to realize that, forty years after A. Robinson, a logician named Walter Felscher still conceived of the history of analysis in terms of a triumphant march out of the dark age of the infinitesimal, and toward the yawning heights of Weierstrassian epsilontics.
D'Alembert's verbal excesses merely put in relief the fact that no such rhetoric is to be found anywhere in either Cauchy 47 Apparently, a kind of a mantra: Bolzano, Cauchy, epsilon, delta; Bolzano, Cauchy, epsilon, delta; . . . which, repeated sufficiently many times, would lead one to accept Felscher's reduction of Cauchy's continuum to an A-continuum (see Appendix A). 48 In discussing Bolzano's attitude toward infinitesimals, we have to distinguish between the early Bolzano and the late Bolzano. The early Bolzano defines the "Infinitely small" as "variable quantities" in the following terms: A quantity is infinitely small if it becomes less than any given quantity (here Bolzano does not speak of "values" [but naturally he thought of them]). The late Bolzano definies infinitely small (and infinitely large) numbers; one of them is 1/(1 + 1 + 1 + . . .) (infinitely many terms). We are grateful to D. Spalt for this historical clarification.
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Measurable number is Bolzano's term for appreciable number (no relation to Lebesgue-measurability). Here Bolzano foreshadows Björling's dichotomy (see [22] ), which can be analyzed in terms of A-and B-continua (see Appendix A). both employed them by comparing numbers and their distances with the help of inequalities in order to prove important theorems in analysis. However, Cauchy defined and used the notion of limit, whereas Bolzano did not. Felscher's assertion concerning continuity and inequalities is misleading. Generally speaking, Cauchy's limit concept is a kinetic one (see Hourya Benis Sinaceur [123] ), and is a derived notion, depending for its definition on the primary notion of a variable quantity. On occasion, Cauchy worked with real inequalities in proofs (see, e.g., Grabiner [61] ), but he never gave such a definition of continuity.
On page 855, line 9, Felscher alleges that Cauchy's first definition of continuity is similar to Bolzano's, with the implication that the terminology of "infinitesimal" is not employed by Cauchy. Now the form in which Cauchy's definition was quoted by Felscher two pages earlier (see our comment above concerning Felscher's page 853) did not employ infinitesimals. But the form in which it appears in Cauchy did employ infinitesimals. On dit qu'une grandeur est la limite d'une autre grandeur, quand la seconde peut approcher de la première plus près que d'une grandeur donnée, si petite qu'on la puisse supposer, sans pourtant que la grandeur qui approche, puisse jamais surpasser la grandeur dont elle approche; ensorte que la différence d'une pareille quantitéà sa limite est absolument inassignable (Encyclopédie, volume 9, page 542). One recognizes here a kinetic definition of limit already exploited by I. Newton.
54 Whatever the merits of attributing visionary status to this quote, what Felscher overlooked is the fact that the article Limite was written by two authors. In reality, the above passage defining the concept of "limit" (as well as the two propositions on limits) did not originate with d'Alembert, but rather with the encyclopedist JeanBaptiste de La Chapelle. De la Chapelle was recruited by d'Alembert to write 270 articles for the Encyclopédie.
The section of the article contaning these items is signed (E) (at bottom of first column of page 542), known to be de La Chapelle's "signature" in the Encyclopedie. Felscher had already committed a one without infinitesimals, and then one using infinitesimals." The second claim is correct, but not the first. 54 3.4. Brillouët-Belluot: epsilon-delta, period. An instructive case study in a bestiarium-consignment attitude toward infinitesimals is the review of Felscher's text for Math Reviews, by one Nicole Brillouët-Belluot [23] . The review contains not an inkling of the fact that the text in question is a broadside attack on scholars attempting to analyze Cauchy's infinitesimals seriously. The reviewer mentions the "epsilondelta technique", and notes that Cauchy made his "definitions [of continuity] precise and used them in today's sense", but fails to mention that the definitions in question are infinitesimal ones, a fact not denied by Felscher (at least in the case of one of the definitions). Her review mentions d'Alembert, who does not appear in Felscher's summary, indicating that she had read the body of Felscher's text itself (rather than merely Felscher's summary).
Brillouët-Belluot notes that Felscher reports on how "limit was explained and used by d'Alembert and Cauchy". She reports neither on Felscher's extensive, and vitriolic, quotes from d'Alembert (including the dramatic phrase "the metaphysics and the infinitely small quantities, whether larger or smaller than one another, are totally useless in the differential calculus"), nor d'Alembert's colorful epithets like charlatanerie/quackery. The reviewer identified with Felscher's conclusions to such an extent that she chose to spare the Math Reviews reader the burden of infinitesimal quackery, judging that Felscher carried that burden once and for all, for the rest of us. 3.6. Medvedev's delicate question. Reviewer Cooke [31] notes that Medvedev [101] "devotes considerable space to refuting the point of view of modern analysis as a thing waiting to be born, which earlier mathematicians were striving unsuccessfully to find and for lack of 55 We are grateful to D. Spalt for this historical clarification. 56 Similar remarks apply to the review of Felscher's text by Reinhard SiegmundSchultze [122] for Zentralblatt Math. Siegmund-Schultze was far less myopic in a later instance occasioned by a review of an English translation of the Cours d'analyse, see footnote 23. [s]ince an adequate response to Berkeley's objections would have involved recognizing that an equation involving limits is a shorthand expression for a sequence of inequalities-a subtle and difficult idea-no eighteenth century analyst gave a fully adequate answer to Berkeley [61, p. 189 ]. This is an astonishing claim, which amounts to reading back into history, developments that came much later. Such a claim amounts to postulating the inevitability of a triumphant march, from Berkeley onward, toward the radiant future of Weierstrassian epsilontics.
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The claim of such inevitability in our opinion is an assumption that requires further argument. 57 Hourya Benis Sinaceur similarly mocks "l'hypothèse d'un développement monolithique, non différencié, continue, univoque de l'analyse au XIX e siecle. Le filon, perdu avec Bolzano, est heureusement retrouvé par Cauchy, qui le redécouvre, l'élargit, l'exploite plus amplement, le transmetà Weierstrass, etc." [123, p. 103] , and names Boyer [20, p. 271] as one of the culprits in perpetuating such a myth.
Berkeley was, after all, attacking the coherence of infinitesimals. 58 He was not attacking the coherence of some kind of incipient form of Weierstrassian epsilontics and its inequalities. Isn't there a simpler answer to Berkeley's query, in terms of a passage from a point of Bcontinuum (see Appendix A), to the infinitely close point of the Acontinuum, namely passing from a variable quantity to its limiting constant quantity?
A related attitude on the part of Felscher is discussed in Section 2.3. Like Felscher, Grabiner [61, p. 190 ] suppresses Cauchy's reference to an infinitesimal increment of the independent variable when citing Cauchy's first definition (see Table 1 in Section 2.3 above), thereby managing to avoid discussing Cauchy's infinitesimals altogether. We encounter the oft-repeated claim about "the same confusion between uniform and point-wise convergence"
59 [61, p. 191] . Her discussion of Cauchy's rigor does not mention that what rigor meant to Cauchy was the replacement of the principle of the generality of algebra, by geometry, including infinitesimals. Grabiner correctly points out [61, p. 193] that "Mathematicians are used to taking the rigorous foundations for calculus for granted." She concludes: "What I have tried to do as a historian is to reveal what went into making up that great achievement." What we have tried to do is to introduce a necessary correction to a post-Weierstrassian reading of Cauchy, influenced by an automated infinitesimal-to-limits translation originating no later than Boyer [19, p. 277 ], see [75] for additional details. Berkeley's criticism is dissected into its metaphysical and logical components by D. Sherry [121] .
59 See Subsection 2.4 for a detailed discussion of the controversy over the "sum theorem". 60 The article is online at http://www.maa.org/devlin/devlin 11 06.html KD: Actually, she does say that: "Delta-epsilon proofs are first found in the works of Augustin-Louis Cauchy (1789-1867). This is not always recognized, since Cauchy gave a purely verbal definition of limit, which at first glance does not resemble modern definitions." In the UK when I was a student, the standard term to refer to the usual ǫ-δ definition was "the Cauchy-Weierstrass definition", and by my read of Grabiner that description seems appropriate.
MK: But my question concerned the definition of continuity. In the UK, did they refer to a Cauchy-Weierstrass definition of continuity?
KD: It's the same. f (x) is continuous at a if and only if f (a) is defined and lim x→a f (x) = f (a).
MK: Keith, this is your definition of continuity. It is not Cauchy's definition of continuity, for several reasons: (1) Cauchy did not at any time work with "continuity at a point", it is always continuity "between two limits", i.e. on an interval. (2) Cauchy's definition is invariably an infinitesimal one: "an infinitesimal x-increment always produces an infinitesimal y-increment". (3) Elsewhere, Cauchy is working for the most part with a kinetic definition of limit, akin to that found in Newton.
62 Thus, the primary notion is that of a variable quantity. Both infinitesimals and limits are defined in terms of variable quantity. Could the notion of a "Cauchy-Weierstrass definition of continuity" be an ahistorical blunder, regardless of whether it was adopted by the mathematicians at a UK college? KD: That was actually the way continuity was taught in the UK. To my mind, once you have the basic epsilon-delta idea, which is a clever static capture of the dynamic concept, everything just drops out. It comes down to that one idea. And according to that Grabiner article, that was due to Cauchy and then Weierstrass. Of course, once we had that definition, our entire conception changed, and it may be that it is only from a modern perspective that we can clearly see that there is really just one fundamental notion there. That happens all the time, of course. Our present day conception of Newton's differential calculus 61 The link provided is a link to an electronic version of Grabiner's article [61] . 62 See footnote 15.
is not the one Newton had. 63 Sounds like you are trying to get at how the people at the time conceived things.
MK: What you seem to be saying is that, even though Cauchy himself said nothing of the sort regarding continuity, from a certain "modern perspective" is it proper to interpret Cauchy in a certain way, now that in retrospect we know that the epsilontic idea is the "fundamental notion". This is precisely the ideology that I seek to refute. Felix Klein pointed out in 1908 (in the original edition of his "Elementary mathematics from an advanced viewpoint") that there are really two parallel strands to the development of analysis, the epsilontic one and the infinitesimal one. Emile Borel in 1902 developed further du BoisReymond's theory of infinitesimal-enriched continua in terms of growth rates of functions, and specifically refers to Cauchy's work in this direction from 1829 as inspiration. Note that Klein and Borel said this well before Robinson. Viewed as the "father" of the infinitesimal approach ultimately vindicated by Robinson, Cauchy needn't suffer a forced explanation as a proto-Weierstrassian. Rather, his approach to infinitesimals was further developed by Stolz, du Bois-Reymond, Borel, Levi-Civita, and others around the turn of the century. When Skolem developed first non-standard models of arithmetic in 1934, he was inspired partly by du Bois-Reymond's work, according to Robinson. In 1948, Hewitt first developed hyperreal fields using ultraproducts. In 1955, Loś proved his theorem for ultraproducts, which implies the transfer principle, which is the mathematical implementation of Leibniz's heuristic "law of continuity": whatever succeeds for the finite, should also succeed for the infinite. Isn't this lineage of infinitesimal calculus more plausible than an alleged "Cauchy-Weierstrass definition of continuity"? KD: Ah, I assume you are a historian of mathematics. For sure my perspective is very much that of mathematicians, who if they have any interest in history (and I do) it is precisely from the perspective you describe, tracing back the origins of the now accepted concepts in terms that we now use. For instance, we interpret Newton's work on calculus as applied to continuous functions of a real variable, when that is not at all what Newton was doing. (Actually, I don't think we can really understand what he was doing, since we are rooted in a modern perspective.) Good luck with your investigations. 63 Pourciau refutes this view; see footnote 15. 64 Devlin's article acknowledges that it is based on Núñez et al [108] , who similarly employ the term "Cauchy-Weierstrass definition of continuity".
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To put the above exchange in perspective, it may be useful to recall Grattan-Guinness's articulation of a historical reconstruction project in the name of H. Freudenthal [52] 
Timeline of modern infinitesimals from Cauchy onward
The historical sequence of events, as far as continuity is concerned, was as follows:
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(1) first came Cauchy's infinitesimal definition, namely "infinitesimal x-increment always produces an infinitesimal y-increment"; (2) then came the Dirichlet/Weierstrass-style nominalistic reconstruction of the original definition in terms of real inequalities, dispensing with infinitesimals;
65 Grattan-Guinness's term "muddle" refers to an irreducible ambiguity of historical mathematics such as Cauchy's sum theorem of 1821. 66 Robinson uses instead the term "finiteness principle of lower predicate calculus" [112, p. 48] for what is known today as the compactness theorem.
67 Some details on the ultrapower construction appear in Appendix A. 68 We leave out Bolzano's contribution which, while prior to Cauchy's, did not exert any influence until the 1860s. [49] . IST amounts to a more stratified axiomatisation for set theory, more congenial to infinitesimals. In Nelson's system, the usual construction of R, when interpreted with respect to the foundational background provided by IST, produces a number system already possessing entities behaving as infinitesimals.
In more detail, Nelson's approach is a re-thinking of the foundational material with a view to allowing a more stratified (hierarchical) number line. Thus, the canonical set theory, namely ZFC, is modified by the introduction of a unary predicate "standard". Then what is known as the usual construction of the "real" line produces a line that bears a striking resemblance to the Hewitt-Loś-Robinson hyperreals.
To 
and writes [. . . ] sit arcus z infinite parvus; erit cos ·z = 1, sin ·z = z; sit autem n numerus infinite magnus, ut sit arcus nz finitae magnitudinis, puta nz = v
In the context of internal set theory, this argument becomes fully rigorous.
Conclusion
As we have seen, Cauchy experimented with a range of foundational approaches, including infinitesimal methodologies. He anticipated a number of mathematical developments that occurred decades later. One such development was the study of the asymptotic behavior and rates of growth of functions, culminating in the construction of infinitesimal-enriched continua by du Bois-Reymond, Emile Borel, G. H. Hardy, and others. Another development anticipated by Cauchy was the Dirac delta function, of which Cauchy gave an infinitesimal definition. Similarly, Björling and Cauchy both articulated singlevariable definitions of stronger forms of continuity and convergence (today called uniform), in the context of infinitesimal-enriched continua. One avenue for further exploration is Cauchy's infinitesimal approach to the degrees of contact among curves. 73 Such visionary anticipations in Cauchy are studiously obfuscated by scholars sporting protective blinders, conditioned by a conceptual framework stemming from a nominalistic reconstruction of analysis set in motion by the "great triumvirate" of Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass. According to the rules of such feedback-style ahistory, to borrow GrattanGuinness's term, 74 Cauchy's infinitesimals are subjected to an automated translation to limits, the latter being promoted to first fiddle, Cauchy's explicit statements to the contrary notwithstanding (see Subsection 3.1). Yet, many historians have refused to toe the triumvirate line. Cauchy's anticipations are highlighted in insightful studies by Freudenthal [51] , Robinson [112] , Hourya Benis Sinaceur [123] , Lakatos [89] , Cleave [30] , Cutland et al [32] , Medvedev [101] , Laugwitz [91] , Sad et al [116] , Bråting [22] , and others.
It bears pointing out that the the calculus of Newton and Leibniz was not the same as ours, since they did not have a continuum that lives up to modern standards. Yet historians routinely attribute the invention of the calculus to them, implicitly taking it for granted that the calculus of Newton and Leibniz can be interpreted in terms of modern calculus, and vice versa. Isn't it time we applied such bi-interpretability to Cauchy's infinitesimals, as well? st B-continuum A-continuum Figure 1 . Thick-to-thin: taking standard part (the thickness of the top line is merely conventional) from the finite part of a B-continuum (for "Bernoullian"), to the Acontinuum (for "Archimedean"), as illustrated in Figure 1 .
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We will denote such a B-continuum by a new symbol IIR. We will also denote its finite part, by IIR <∞ = {x ∈ IIR : |x| < ∞} ; namely, the difference IIR \ IIR <∞ consists of the inverses of nonzero infinitesimals. The map "st" sends each finite point x ∈ IIR, to the real point st(x) ∈ R infinitely close to x:
Robinson's answer to Berkeley's logical criticism (see D. Sherry [121] ) is to define the derivative of y = f (x) as f ′ (x) = st ∆y ∆x , rather than the infinitesimal ratio ∆y/∆x itself, as in Leibniz. "However, this is a small price to pay for the removal of an inconsistency" [112, p 266] . We illustrate the construction by means of an infinite-resolution microscope in Figure 2 .
Note that both the term "hyper-real field", and an ultrapower construction thereof, are due to E. Hewitt in 1948, see [69, p. 74] . The transfer principle allowing one to extend every first-order real statement to the hyperreals, is due to J. Loś in 1955, see [96] . Thus, the 75 In the context of the hyperreal extension of the real numbers, the map "st" sends each finite point x to the real point st(x) ∈ R infinitely close to x. In other words, the map "st" collapses the cluster of points infinitely close to a real number x, back to x. A comparative study of continua from a predicative angle may be found in Feferman [42] . Hewitt's construction of hyper-real fields has roots in functional analysis, including works by Gelfand and Kolmogorov [53] . In 1990, Hewitt reminisced about his "efforts to understand the ring of all real-valued continuous [not necessarily bounded] functions on a completely regular T 0 -space. I was guided in part by a casual remark made by Gel'fand and Kolmogorov 76 [. . . ] Along the way I found a novel class of real-closed fields that superficially resemble the real number field and have since become the building blocks for nonstandard analysis. I had no luck in talking to Artin about these hyperreal fields, though he had done interesting work on real-closed fields in the 1920s. (My published 'proof' that hyperreal fields are real-closed is false: John Isbell earned my gratitude by giving a correct proof some years later.) [. . . ] My ultra-filters also struck no responsive chords. Only Irving Kaplansky seemed to think my ideas had merit. My first paper on the subject was published only in 1948" [70] (Hewitt goes on to detail the influence of his 1948 text). Here Hewitt is referring to Isbell's 1954 paper [71] , proving that Hewitt's hyper-real fields are real closed. Note that a year later, Loś [96] proved the general transfer principle for such fields, implying in particular the property of being real closed. 76 Here Hewitt cites Gelfand and Kolmogoroff [53] . see Figure 3 . Here a sequence u n : n ∈ N is in F u if and only if the set {n ∈ N : u n = 0} is a member of a fixed ultrafilter.
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To give an example, the sequence (−1) n n represents a nonzero infinitesimal, whose sign depends on whether or not the set 2N is a member of the ultrafilter. To obtain a full hyperreal field, we replace Q by R in the construction, and form a similar quotient IIR := R N F u .
A more detailed discussion of the ultrapower construction can be found in M. Davis [35] . See also B laszczyk [14] for some philosophical implications. More advanced properties of the hyperreals such as saturation were proved later, see Keisler [84] for a historical outline. A helpful "semicolon" notation for presenting an extended decimal expansion of a hyperreal was described by A. H. Lightstone [95] . See also 77 An ultrafilter on N can be thought of as a way of making a systematic choice, between each pair of complementary infinite subsets of N, so as to prescribe which one is "dominant" and which one is "negligible". Such choices have to be made in a coherent manner, e.g., if a subset A ⊂ N is negligible then any subset of A is negligible, as well. The existence of ultrafilters was proved by Tarski [131] , see Keisler [85, Theorem 2.2] . See a related remark about P-points in footnote 69. Table 3 . Modern mathematical implementation of 17th century heuristic concepts.
P. Roquette [113] for infinitesimal reminiscences. A discussion of infinitesimal optics is in K. Stroyan [127] , H. J. Keisler [83] , D. Tall [128] , L. Magnani & R. Dossena [99, 36] , and Bair & Henry [7] . Applications of the B-continuum range from aid in teaching calculus [41, 73, 74, 129, 130] to the Bolzmann equation (see L. Arkeryd [4, 5] ); modeling of timed systems in computer science (see H. Rust [115] ); mathematical economics (see R. Anderson [3] ); mathematical physics (see Albeverio et al. [1] ); etc.
An interesting elementary example of a B-continuum is the ring of dual numbers, that is, numbers of the form a + bδ, where δ 2 = 0. It is useful, for example, in the theory of linear algebraic groups and linear Lie groups, and enable a quick and transparent computation of Lie algebras of groups like SO 3 (R).
Recently, Giordano [55, 56, 57] introduced a systematic way of enriching the reals by nilpotent infinitesimals, referring to the resulting structure as the ring of Fermat reals.
The transfer principle of the modern theory of infinitesimals is a mathematical implementation of Leibniz's heuristic law of continuity, see Robinson [112, p. 266] , and Laugwitz [92] . The standard part function is a mathematical implementation of Fermat's concept of adequality, see Table 3 .
